

4 Oct 61

TCS-10185-61/A

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Summary of Studies Made Concerning Possible
U-2 Flight Over USSR

1. Following is a resume of what has been taking place in the Intelligence Community during the past week since the proposal was made by SAC to fly U-2 aircraft over [REDACTED] 25X1X4 There have been four different studies made by different groups, some of which have been consolidated into joint papers. These are (a) political implications (Dept. of State); (b) priority requirements (COMOR); (c) vulnerability (DOD/CIA); and (d) mission routes (JCS/SAC). The status of the State paper is unknown. The COMOR paper on requirements has been made available to you, and the vulnerability study has been a matter of daily discussion since the proposal was made. The routes prepared by the JCS/SAC have resulted in various estimates of survivability. The Agency's paper, which is attached, is assuming the targets to be covered would be those outlined by the COMOR Group, i. e., the five known [REDACTED] 25X1X4

JCS/SAC are also recommending that these targets be covered by more than one aircraft simultaneously. This particular difference of COMOR requirements vs. JCS/SAC requirements is a question to be resolved.

2. Our position to date has been to accept the COMOR priorities and compute vulnerability studies on these targets. The ground rules for coming up with the survivability percentages are outlined in the attached documents and based on the joint DOD/CIA survivability estimates. Routes over these targets were selected to avoid all possible opposition but still accomplish the primary objective of obtaining a vertical photograph of the target. This requires the aircraft to pass within 7 1/2 miles of the target to be vertically photographed. The Agency is assuming that all routes to and from the targets would avoid known SAM sites and, to the extent possible, avoid known fighter areas.

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3. Summing up the operation aspects of this mission, we do have the equipment and the personnel to execute the sortie. The survivability will be dependent upon reaction time of the enemy to organize his forces. Our planning would keep this to the minimum possible. The survivability over targets can be argued, depending on what set of criteria you use; however, the estimates given in the attached document are thought to be the best available since experts from all agencies had the opportunity to voice their opinion and state their estimates. One aspect that is intangible and is always present is the operational estimate. This assumes surprise, confusion, equipment malfunctions and command deficiencies will tip the scale towards a successful operation.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Attachment
TCS-10185-61

Signature recommended:

Acting Chief, DPD

AC/DPD:SWB:jr (5 Oct 61)

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